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Trade Regulation—Sherman Act—Combinations to Compete and Re-
place—Maximum Price Fixing in a Non-Competitive Market—Albrecht
v. The Herald Co.'—The Herald Company publishes a morning newspaper,
the Globe-Democrat, which is distributed in the metropolitan St. Louis area.
Distribution is accomplished through independent carriers, who buy news-
papers from the Herald Company at wholesale and sell them at retail. The
carriers have agreements with the Herald Company assigning a territory
to each carrier and providing that no one will compete with the carrier
within his territory. The exclusive territory arrangement is subject to termi-
nation if the carrier charges more than a maximum retail price "suggested"
by Herald and published in its Globe-Democrat.
Albrecht began in 1961 to charge more than the suggested resale price.
Herald objected to this practice many times, and finally in 1964 it informed
Albrecht that it would compete with him within his territory because of his
practice of overcharging. Thereafter, Herald sent letters to the subscribers
in Albrecht's territory offering to deliver the newspapers at the lower, sug-
gested price to any who wished to transfer from Albrecht to direct delivery.
In addition, Herald hired Milne Circulation Sales, Inc., to solicit Albrecht's
customers. Their combined efforts resulted in a switch of about 300 of Al-
brecht's 1200 customers.
When the solicitation by Milne and Herald had been completed, the
latter turned a new route, consisting of the 300 customers, over to George
Kroner, who knew of Herald's policy on overcharging and understood that
he might have to return the route if Albrecht stopped charging his customers
more than Herald's suggested retail price. Later Herald advised Albrecht
that he could recover the lost customers if he charged the "suggested" price.
On August 12, 1964, plaintiff Albrecht filed suit for treble damages
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2 charging that a combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade had been formed between Herald and Albrecht's
customers 3 and/or Milne and/or Kroner." In response to this suit, the Herald
Company terminated Albrecht's status as a carrier. Albrecht sold his route
within 60 days for $1200. This was $1000 more than he had paid for the
route, but less than he would have realized if he still had 1200 customers.
At the trial court, there was a jury verdict for the defendant Herald
Company. Albrecht's request for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was denied. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 5 It
1 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3
 The Court suggested that the allegation of a combination between the Herald
Company and Albrecht's customers was not frivolous. 390 U.S. at 150 n.6. Although
they did not pass upon this claim in the decision, the addition of the footnote suggests
the possibility of further expansion of the combination doctrine into other areas.
4 Milne and Kroner were not named by the plaintiff as parties defendant. However,
during the trial Albrecht was allowed to amend his petition, which had originally alleged
a combination between Herald and persons unknown, to allege one between Herald,
Milne and Kroner. See Brief for Respondent at 12, Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1963).
5 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966).
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found there had been no combination or conspiracy formed by the Herald.
Furthermore, the court stated that it could find no restraint of trade. 6
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and
HELD: the Herald Company's activities with Kroner and MiMe formed
a combination; and furthermore that the setting of a maximum resale price,
irrespective of any exclusive territory situation, was a per se violation of
the Sherman Act,' In the majority opinion, written by justice White, the
Court found that the activities of Herald, Milne and Kroner were in con-
junction with one another, and thus that Herald did not act unilaterally.
Since there was a combination formed, and the purpose of the combination
was involved with some form of price fixing, there was a per se violation.
0 The majority could find no difference between setting a minimum resale
price, an activity traditionally considered a per se violation of the Sherman
Act, 8 and setting a maximum, in that both substitute the seller's judgment
for competitive market forces. They felt that the maximum-price restriction
both crippled the freedom of traders and substantially interfered with non-
price competition? The Court rejected a contention that setting a maximum
price was in the public interest because the exclusive territory arrangement
had given Albrecht monopoly control over his customers. The majority deci-
sion, however, was careful to refrain from passing upon the legality of the
exclusive territory arrangement in the case."
In a concurring opinion, 11 Justice Douglas agreed with the majority that
there had been a combination formed by Herald, Al ilne and Kroner. In
addition, applying a "rule of reason" approach to the facts, he found that
the price-setting arrangement was unreasonable because of the effect which
that price had upon the market.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented from the majority
view i2 The dissenters felt that the basic situation, one of non-competition,
made inapplicable the traditional reasons for finding a fixing of prices to be
6 To a limited extent, every combination tends to have a restraining effect upon
trade. Thus a broad application of section 1 would make many innocuous activities
illegal. To prevent this absurd result, the courts have employed a "rule of reason,"
whereby illegality under section 1 is limited to those combinations where the restraint is
unreasonable. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). However,
the courts have found that combinations formed for certain purposes, such as minimum
price fixing, almost always tend to restrain trade and that there is no need to try the
issue of restraint. In such instances, as a matter of simplifying administration of the Act,
courts have not bothered to examine the facts of individual case - to find those few where
the restraint might be reasonable. For this reason, a combination may be deemed to be per
se illegal without any actual restraint being shown. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1911); Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing--Sans Power,
Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 837 (1952).
7 390 U.S. at 150, 154.
8 See authority cited note 6 supra.
9 The Albrecht Court referred to one form of non-price competition, that involving
essential services provided with a product. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
79 The Court mentioned the exclusive territory arrangement but stated that the
problem was not at issue before the jury, so it would not even be considered upon appeal.
390 U.S. at 153.
11 Id. at 154.
12 Id. at 168.
209
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
illegal. Earlier cases considering price ceilings did not also involve exclusive
territory arrangements." They thought a monopolist should not be allowed
to take advantage of the right to exercise independent judgment in pricing.
Thus, they concluded, the imposition of price restraints did not adversely
affect trade in this particular instance; as a result, the majority decision
"[stood] the Sherman Act on its head."14
In a separate dissenting opinion, 15
 Justice Harlan strongly disagreed
with the application of a per se approach to price ceilings. He felt that the
majority had disregarded the economic considerations underlying the Act.
Although fixing a minimum price is clearly a per se violation because it neces-
sarily lessens competition, fixing a maximum price does not necessarily have
that effect. Application of a "rule of reason" to the case should have resulted
in a finding that there was no restraint of trade.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination
... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is . . . illegal. . . .'''°
Thus there are two distinct elements essential to a violation: a form of
combination and a restraint of trade. This case note will consider each of
these elements in the Albrecht decision, and will evaluate the soundness of
the changes made by Albrecht.
The Combination Issue. The language of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act expressly bars any form of contract, 11
 conspiracy or combination. Since
the inception of the Sherman Act, the meaning of `;combination" has been
subject to an increasingly broad interpretation. The Court's decision in
Albrecht continues this trend in the case law to broaden the concept of com-
bination, and thereby makes more activities illegal under the Act.
In United States v. Colgate & Co.," a case decided in 1919, the Court
greatly limited the application of the term "combination." It held that the
Sherman Act does not prevent a manufacturer from announcing in advance
the prices at which his goods may be resold and from refusing to deal with
those who do not conform to the prices. In so doing, the Court reaffirmed
the statutory requirement of combination, and allowed a broad definition
of unilateral activity. Since the Colgate decision, however, courts have con-
sistently modified this view by declaring less conduct unilateral, thereby al-
lowing the Sherman Act to encompass activities where there would have been
no combination under Colgate.
In United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.," the Court went further than
ever before in finding a combination: it held that an announcement of a pric-
ing policy was sufficient to form a combination between a manufacturer, his
wholesalers and his retailers, when the manufacturer actively induced un-
13 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S 211
(1951).
14 390 U.S. at 170.
15 Id. at 156.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1961).
17 This prohibition includes express contracts, as in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and implied contracts, as in United States v.
A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
18 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
10 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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willing retailers to comply with the pricing policy. Thus the holding of Parke,
Davis established that a combination is formed "if the producer secures ad-
herence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere declina-
tion to sell." 2° This rule considerably narrowed the Colgate concept of what
was unilateral. The Albrecht decision further restricts the conduct of pro-
ducers.
The Court could have found a combination in Albrecht by applying the
standards laid down in Parke, Davis. The facts amply support the conclusion
that the Herald Company's activities went beyond merely declining to deal
with Albrecht.21 In addition to its policy announcement requiring adherence
to its maximum prices, Herald began to compete with Albrecht and take his
.. customers after Albrecht had failed to comply. Even more important, it ad-
vised Albrecht that the customers would be returned if he reduced his price.
In this respect, the Herald Company acted to bring about compliance, action
sufficient to create a combination between Herald and Albrecht under Parke,
Davis.
It is apparent that the Court did not find a Parke, Davis type combina-
tion because the parties included in the Albrecht combination were different
from those that would have been in a Parke, Davis type.22 Albrecht was not
a party to the combination found by the Court, but he would have been a
party under Parke, Davis. Likewise, it would have been unnecessary under
Parke, Davis to include Milne and Kroner, but they were parties to the com-
bination found by the Court in Albrecht.
This is the expansion of the concept of combination made in Albrecht.
Milne and Kroner are made parties. Therefore, their activities take on added
significance. Both parties were brought into the controversy with Albrecht
only after the latter had already begun charging the higher price. Neither
Milne nor Kroner was involved in the actual suggestion of price limits, nor
in any attempt to secure Albrecht's compliance in advance. The activities
that were relied upon to find a combination in Albrecht all occurred after
non-compliance, as part of Herald's effort to have Albrecht reduce his price
back to the "suggested" maximum. All of Herald's activities in establishing
the pricing policy and initially seeking compliance, the areas courts tradi-
tionally examine to find a combination, 2" had been handled unilaterally. In
Colgate and Parke, Davis, the courts did not even examine activities subse-
quent to the imposition of the price regulation; the actions of Milne and
Kroner fall entirely into this last category.
In addition to involvement only after the price restricting had occurred,
the activities of Milne and Kroner were only tangentially related to the
actual restraint. Milne was the Herald Company's regular circulation sales
20 Id. at 43.
21 See p. 208 supra.
22 The Court was prevented from applying Parke, Davis because Albrecht abandoned
any assertion that he was included in a combination w hen he amended his complaint
during the trial. The Court acknowledged, however, that a Parke, Davis combination had
been created. 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
23 E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213-14
(1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399 -400
(1911).
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agency. Its activities involving Albrecht consisted solely of competing for
Albrecht's customers through offers to sell at a lower price. The Sherman
Act prohibition of combinations in restraint of trade has developed in part
as a law to protect competition and prohibit those activities adversely af-
fecting it.24 In contrast, the Herald's hiring of Milne created competition. In
Albrecht the Court disregarded the fact that the combination itself promoted
competition, and instead focused upon the Herald Company's purpose behind
the combination, which was to force Albrecht to reduce his price. Thus the
decision has the effect of prohibiting activities based upon their ultimate
purpose, regardless of their direct effect.
The inclusion of Kroner in the combination illustrates the extent to
which the Court disregarded the propriety of the activity and examined only
its indirect effect upon the restraint. At no time did Kroner ever compete
with Albrecht for customers. Instead, Kroner was a replacement for Albrecht,
serving those customers who had already been taken away. Kroner was
never directly involved with Albrecht, and was not involved at all until
after the solicitation had taken place. Under the Colgate doctrine, a party
may simply refuse to deal. 25 It was implicit in Colgate that after this refusal
the rejected party could be replaced by another person who would perform
the same function. The Albrecht Court's inclusion of Kroner may mean,
then, that a non-adhering party may be eliminated by refusal to deal, but
may not be replaced, even by a party not previously involved in the price-
fixing if the purpose of the replacement is to promote the restraining scheme.
The Court in Albrecht has realized that there is very little business
activity that may be considered unilateral. Early cases declared activity
illegal when a combination was formed to organize or implement a restraint
on a third party. 26 Parke, Davis extended this prohibition by recognizing
that every restraint involves at least two parties, one who imposes the re-
straint and one who is restrained.27 In Albrecht, the Court has included a
class of parties previously omitted, those not directly involved in the imposi-
tion of the restraint, but whose relationship with the restraining party has
an indirect effect of promoting the restraint. Under Albrecht, a combination
may be found even though the planning, preparation and the imposition of
the restraint are handled unilaterally. The Court found a combination by
examining activities neither directly promoting the restraint nor directly
involved with it. In so doing, the Albrecht decision may sound the death
knell for all restraints of trade by the virtual elimination of the Sherman
Act's combination requirements.
The result in Albrecht is not unreasonable when viewed in light of the
purpose of the Sherman Act, to prevent unreasonable restraints of trade.26
No business activity is truly unilateral, so it should be immaterial whether
the restraint is the object of the joint activity or only an incidental effect.
24 See p. 214 infra.
25 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
20 Kg., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S.441 (1922); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park 8: Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
27 See 390 U.S. at 149.
28 See pp. 213-14 infra.
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The restraint itself, which may be the same in either instance, is the activity
that is being proscribed. The original requirement of a form of combination
to constitute a violation arose out of the common law origin of the Sherman
Act, which had its basis in conspiracy law. 2° In Parke, Davis, the Court
realized the absurdity of such a requirement, but felt that so long as Colgate
was not overruled, the requirement must be tolerated. 3° In Albrecht, the Su-
preme Court has once again felt restricted by the Colgate decision. Instead of
finally overruling it, however, the Court justified its decision on the basis of
a combination only remotely connected to the actual restraint.
The Restraint Issue. Once a court has made a determination that a
combination exists, to find the conduct illegal under the Sherman Act it must
also determine whether the results of that combination are a restraint of
trade or commerce. Situations where the combination has been ancillary
to fixing minimum prices have been one major area where a restraint
of trade is always found. 31 Because this restriction almost always has an ad-
verse effect upon trade, a combination to fix minimum prices has been held
illegal per se. The illegality of price restrictions rests upon two divergent rea-
sons.32 One reason for prohibiting price restraints is the effect which they
inevitably place upon the actions of traders. Without any artificial restric-
tions, a merchant is free to exercise his own judgment, to make his own
pricing decisions subject only to the influence of the marketplace. These
options are lost when outside restrictions are imposed. It is the very nature
of price restrictions, in that they infringe upon freedom to conduct business
independently, which serves to make price fixing so reprehensible.
This "free trading" rationale developed early in the common law, long
before the drafting of the Sherman Act. The original justification for de-
claring such restraints illegal was that the producer withheld an interest in
the goods even after the title to them had passed. This extension of control
was regarded as obnoxious to public policy because it retarded freedom of
traffic in essential goods. Free alienability, on the other hand, was a quality
desirable both for land, where the concept originated, and for personalty.
Early decisions found unreasonable restraints upon alienation to be unen-
forceable as against public policy. In Hilton v. Eckersley," an English court
found that pricing restrictions tend "directly to impede and interfere with
the free course of trade and manufacture." 34 Thus, even before the enactment
of the Sherman Act, courts adopted the concept of free alienation and free
decision-making to strike down price-fixing schemes. Later, this concept was
22 Cf. Allen, Criminal Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade at Common Law, 23 Harv.
L. Rev. 531, 533 (1910); H. Thorelli, Federal Antitrust Policy 15 (1955).
30 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
31 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927). In
Trenton Potteries, the Court discounted the reasonableness of the price because "reason-
able prices may become unreasonable through market changes." It is this potential for
abuse that makes the restraint unlawful, regardless of how it is actually used. See also
Comment, supra note 6.
32 See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 687 (1962).
33 119 Eng. Rep. 781 (Ex. 1855).
34 Id. at 784. This policy was adopted also in the United States. See People v. Fisher,
14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1835).
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a major force behind an original draft of the Act, which provided that one
of its purposes was "to preserve freedom of trade and production." 35
The other major reason for a rule of per se illegality for price fixing
has been its role in restricting competition." According to elementary eco-
nomic theory, competition in the marketplace sets the optimum price level
for a product. 37
 This price is the best for efficiency and proper allocation
of resources. Therefore any deviation from this price necessarily results in
loss of efficiency and in the improper allocation of resources. For this reason,
artificial price fixing, which lessens the influence of the competitive market-
place, is to be avoided. The original draft of the Sherman Act provided that,
in addition to the promotion of free trade, a major purpose of the legisla-
tion was "to preserve ... the lowering of prices by . . . competition."38
Thus there are two major bases for the illegality of price restrictions.
In spite of their differing origins, these two rationales are interrelated. One
reason for the protection of freedom of traders is that restricted alienability ad-
versely affects "trade and traffic and bargaining. . . ." 39
 Freedom to trade,
insofar as it affects the bargaining process, directly affects competition; thus
the two categories are not mutually exclusive as there are sound reasons
behind promotion of freedom of traders in the modern economy. There are,
however, other reasons for protecting the freedom of trade which are unre-
lated to competition and economics, such as the individual's right to free
exercise of choice." Thus the different bases for price fixing illegality tend to
overlap, but they are not identical. Both the competition and freedom-of-
the-trader rationales were applied by courts in declaring fixing of minimum
prices to be illegal per se. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co.,41
 the Supreme Court distinguished the method of application of the
two doctrines. The Court determined that freedom of traders was an issue
to be adjudicated by balancing the advantage to the manufacturer in price
maintenance against the freedom of trade of dealers who own what they sell.
The Court concluded that agreements to destroy price competition were so
injurious to the public interest that they must be void, regardless of the
advantages which the participants expected to derive. 42 It is important to
notice that this rationale was developed where competition was involved.
Since Dr. Miles, the courts have been haphazard in expressing their
reasons for holding price fixing to be illegal per se and eventually they have
extended the Dr. Miles result to cases where the rationale no longer applied.
This development began in minimum price cases where per se illegality
was founded upon the combination of diminished competition and restric-
tion of freedom of traders. Of the two effects, the adverse effect upon com-
35 S. 2906, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888).
36 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) ; Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
37 See generally, L. Reynolds, Economics, A General Introduction (1963). See also
R. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation 331-37 (1965).
38
 See S. 2906, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888).
39 Coke's Commentaries § 360.
42 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 ( 191 9).
41 220 U.S. 373 ( 1 9 11 ).
42 Id. at 404-08.
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petition was the one most important to the courts. 43 When cases arose which
involved maximum prices, the courts also applied a per se rule. This was
applied apparently because the courts saw no difference between setting
maximum and minimum prices." There is, however, an important distinction
making the competition rationale applied in minimum price cases inapplicable
in maximum price cases. Price competition is still possible under a maximum
price restraint since lowering of prices, the most common manifestation of
price competition, is still permissible.
In Albrecht, the Court continued its past practice of extending its per se
rule in price fixing to new situations without fully appraising the differences
which the new situation presented. The Court ignored the exclusive territory
arrangement, and applied the per se doctrine because of the disruptive effect
of the restraint upon individual freedom:15
In spite of the Court's analysis it is apparent that in situations like
Albrecht there can be no competition of any kind, even non-price competi-
tion. The exclusive territory arrangement precluded the possibility of any
form of competition, regardless of whether the price was one reached nat-
urally or one established by the producer. Therefore, in spite of the Court's
reference to competition to support its application of a per se rule,'" Albrecht
presents a situation lacking in any basis for a competition argument. The
Court was required by the peculiar fact situation to base its decision solely
upon the issue of freedom of traders. 47
The complete elimination of the competition rationale renders ques-
tionable the application of a per se approach in Albrecht. With both freedom
of traders and some form of competition involved, as in those cases prior
to Albrecht, the Court could justify the ultimate application of illegality
per se upon the overwhelming harm to the public interest caused by the loss
of competition. With the most important of the effects of the restriction
made irrelevant in cases like Albrecht, the "freedom of traders" rationale
may still justify declaring a price-fixing arrangement illegal, but the absence
43 See authorities cited note 36 supra.
44 The first mention of the application of the per se doctrine to maximum prices was
in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Although the case
did not involve a maximum price, the Court stated, in dictum, "I_ Al combination formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
the price of a commodity . . . is illegal per se." Id. at 223 (emphasis added). Later, in a
decision which actually involved setting a maximum resalvipriee, the Court referred to
this dictum in its decision. In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Jose E. Seagram fi Sons, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (1951), defendant Seagram fixed the maximum resale price which its retailers
could charge for defendant's liquor products. The court of appeals found this scheme to
be legal because the price fixing had the effect of promoting rather than restraining com-
petition. 182 F.2d 228, 235 (7th Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court reversed, citing Socony-
Vacuum, and held that maximum price agreements are illegal because, like minimum
price agreements, they have an adverse effect upon traders' freedom to exercise their inde-
pendent judgment.
43 390 U.S. at 152-54.
43 In Albrecht the Court made reference to an effect of maximum prices upon non-
price competition to support application of a per se rule. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
47 The language of the decision referring to non-price competition is simply not
applicable to the fact situation in Albrecht, where there is no competing product or
dealer to whom a customer may turn.
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of competition should require a reevaluation of the reasonableness of the
restraint. Since "freedom of traders" is essentially based upon policy. con-
siderations, in the absence of a supporting rationale involving competition,
other policy considerations should be weighed in the determination of the
legality of a particular arrangement fixing maximum prices.
Dr. Miles suggests roughly how such an evaluation should be made—
by balancing the advantage to the manufacturer of fixed maximum prices
against the freedom of trade of the dealer. 48 In addition, the consumer in-
terest in product price levels should be considered in maximum price situa-
tions, which Dr. Miles did not anticipate. In Albrecht, the publisher had a
strong interest in low prices, as they promote higher circulation, a factor used
by newspapers in setting advertising rates. The consumer interest is also
in favor of maximum price restrictions, since they keep the costs of goods
low. On the other side, Albrecht had a strong interest in being able to deter-
mine his own price, as the route was his source of income.
It is submitted that in situations such as Albrecht, where no competi-
tion was involved, such factors should at least be considered in the determina-
tion of whether the restraint of trade is unreasonable. Adoption of illegality
per se in Albrecht is not justified since the situation is one where an adverse
effect upon trade is no longer predictable.
Conclusion. The Albrecht decision continues the trend of cases ex-
panding the category of activities classified as combinations. In so doing,
it redraws the line to encompass activities involving any other party before,
during, or after the actual imposition of restraint, and either directly or
remotely affecting it. This delineation leaves very little indeed as unilateral.
Finally, the absence of competition has placed the Court in the position of
rendering illegal per se some activities involving price restrictions that may
well be justified when all the interests in the restriction are considered.'"
WILLIAM B. SNEIRSON
48 See p. 214 supra.
4° See also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 363 (1967), where the
Court declared vertical customer and territorial restrictions to be per se illegal. As in
Albrecht, the Court relied solely on a freedom of the trader rationale.
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